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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of Japan’s agricultural domestic policy 
since 1995 in the context of the current international negotiations in the WTO Doha Round, which has as 
one aim further reductions of trade-distorting support among member countries. An overwhelming majority 
of farmers in Japan own small plots of rice paddy fields and earn their living mainly on their off-farm 
income. They go out into rice paddy fields in their spare time as a subsidiary business. Traditional small 
farming communities are powerful voting groups that seek to maintain their political power. By exerting 
political pressures on the authorities, farmers can obtain large returns through the manipulation of farmland 
use regulations, even though such manipulation causes social harm by preventing efficient land use. These 
inefficiencies in land use are a major reason why Japan is the only country whose food self-sufficiency rate 
keeps declining in spite of its heavy agricultural protection. In this sense, Japan is in sharp contrast to 
European and North American countries, where heavy agricultural domestic supports have resulted in an 
increased output of agricultural commodities and subsequent distortions in international markets. 
Apparently, Japan’s attitude towards agricultural domestic policy reform is one of compliance with 
the WTO, which requests member countries to reduce their Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) through 
trimming trade-distorting (amber box) support and/or transforming traditional-type agricultural subsidies to 
decoupled-type ones. Japan reduced its amber box support by nearly 80 percent between 1995 and 2000. 
This drastic reduction is mainly attributable to Japan’s removal of rice from the amber box in 1998. In 
addition, following the WTO’s principle of decoupling, Japan launched an extensive agricultural subsidy 
reform in 2007. This paper, however, shows the ironical realities of Japanese agricultural policy. Neither a 
sharp reduction of amber box support nor Japan’s 2007 reform necessarily mean there will be a reduction of 
trade-distorting effects. On the contrary, the 2007 reform may in fact stimulate domestic rice production. 
In 2007, Japan’s AMS is as little as 18 percent of its commitment level from the Uruguay Round 
WTO agreements. In addition, this paper projects that Japan’s overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) for 
2013 will be 469 billion yen, which is much less than the limit of 1,635 billion yen that is proposed in the 
modalities under discussion in July 2008 for the WTO Doha Round. Thus, the WTO Doha Round 
negotiations on domestic support policy are unlikely to restrict Japan’s domestic agricultural support 
policy.  




1.   INTRODUCTION 
Japan’s agricultural policy presents a rather arcane aspect to outsiders. In spite of its huge fiscal expenditure 
for the agricultural sector, Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio continues to decline, in sharp contrast to 
European and North American countries, where heavy agricultural domestic supports have resulted in 
excesses of agricultural commodities and a subsequent distortion in international markets. In this sense, 
Japan’s agricultural domestic programs may appear harmless to foreign countries. 
Japan’s general attitude toward agricultural domestic policy reform is one of compliance with the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO requests member countries to reduce fiscal expenditures for 
amber box supports, that is, those alleged to have the most trade-distorting effects. Japan reduced its amber 
box expenditures by nearly 80 percent between 1995 and 2000. As a result, Japan reduced its current 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) to as little as 18 percent of its commitment level from the Uruguay 
Round agreements in 2000. In addition, following WTO’s principle of “decoupling,” Japan launched an 
extensive agricultural subsidy reform in 2007. 
This seemingly unimpeachable attitude on domestic agricultural policy reform contrasts with a 
less-flexible attitude on border protections for agricultural commodities. Japan’s nominal protection rate for 
agricultural commodities is one of the highest among developed nations. Japan, which is surrounded by the 
ocean and poorly endowed with natural resources, relies heavily on trade. Nevertheless, Japan’s strong 
resistance to reductions in border agricultural protection has repeatedly hindered its trade negotiations with 
other countries. A typical example is the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations. Up until the last minute, Japan 
lobbied hard to maintain its rice autarky policy, which was an obvious violation of the GATT rules. An 
inflexible stance on rice imports almost resulted in Japan’s failure to join the final agreements. 
In consideration of this background, this paper attempts to answer the following four questions: (1) 
Why has the food self-sufficiency ratio declined in Japan in spite of its heavy agricultural protection? (2) 
Why is Japan so accommodating to the WTO principle of decoupling? (3) How did the sharp reduction of 
Japan’s amber box supports affect its agricultural production? (4) What subsidies compose Japan's 
domestic support notifications to the WTO, and how do these subsidies compare to disciplines under the 
Uruguay Round or a potential Doha Round WTO agreement? 
By answering these questions, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive picture of Japan’s 
agricultural policy. The centerpiece of Japan’s agricultural political dynamics is the “alchemy” of farmland. 
In Japan, farmland regulations are often manipulated, bringing such a large amount of easy money to 
farmland owners that the overwhelming majority of farmers are more concerned with manipulation of 
farmland regulations than earning profits from farming. This alchemy is a deep-seated problem, and 
Japanese citizens (including the mass media and academics) are reluctant to question it. As a result, the 
manipulation of farmland regulations has been treated as a taboo subject for open discussion in Japanese 
society. The present paper aims to defy this taboo and reveal the actual workings of Japanese agricultural 
policy.  
Section 2 describes the overall structure of the political dynamics of Japanese agriculture. 
Farmland and rice are the two major issues in Japanese agricultural policy and are addressed in Sections 3 
and 4, respectively. Section 5 discusses an extensive agricultural policy reform implemented in 2007, while 
Section 6 studies Japan’s notifications of domestic support submitted to the WTO. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.  2 
 
2.   STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE JAPANESE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Discrepancy between Optimal and Actual Farm Sizes 
It is useful to quickly review the geographical and ecological characteristics of Japan’s farmland before 
discussing its problems. Although Japan has substantial rainfall, water flows quickly to the ocean due to the 
mountainous topography. Thus, farmers need a highly sophisticated water control system. Japan’s water 
usage system for paddy fields is unique compared to those of Australasia, North America, and Europe. A 
paddy field consists of many small plots of land. Water drawn from a floodgate of a river moves though all 
plots in a farming community in a set order (from upper plots to lower plots), slowly but continuously. 
Because of this continuous water flow, rice farming in monsoon Asia is free from the continuous cropping 
hazard (damage from repeated cultivation of the same crop in the same soil) that is the biggest farming 
problem in Australasia, North America, and Europe. 
Since farmers in a Japanese farming community share the same water, inappropriate water usage on 
one plot profoundly affects farming in other plots on the paddy field plain. Thus, all the members in a 
farming community must collaborate with each other in the use of farmland and water. 
A traditional farming community in Japan consists of about 20 farm households. Each farmer has 
several tiny plots of land at different locations in a paddy field plain. The average individual farm size is 
around 1.0 hectare. Therefore, farm ownership is expressed as a mosaic pattern. This structure is reasonable 
for traditional small-size farming because each farmer’s paddy field plots adjoin different farmers’ plots at 
various parts of the paddy field plain, allowing farmers to routinely observe each other’s activities, making 
collaboration on water and farmland use easier. 
However, after the development of labor-saving technology in the postwar period, this traditional 
farming community structure turned out to be inefficient. Today it is estimated that the optimal farm size is 
over 15 hectares and that the production cost of rice could be halved if farmland was consolidated into 
large-size farms.
1  
Thus, if the price mechanisms functioned properly in the farmland market, small-size farmers 
would have been weeded out, and only large-size farmers could have survived. In reality, however, the 
average farm size has not increased sufficiently to capture this economy of scale. Nearly 70 percent of 
Japan’s farmland is still operated by inefficient tiny-scale farmers whose farms are less than 3.0 hectares.
2 
As of 2005, the average farm size was still around 1.4 hectares. While large-acreage farms that exceed 30 
hectares have also emerged, the number is still small.
3 
                                                      
1 See Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 1992. 
2 This figure is taken from the data for the totaled results for all prefectures except Hokkaido in the 2005 Agricultural Census. 
3 The number of farms that exceed 30 hectares is 555. This is less than 0.02 % of the total number of farms (2.8 million). 
These figure are taken from the data for the totaled results for all prefectures except Hokkaido in the 2005 Agricultural Census. 3 
 
Table 1. Comparison of household income as of 2003 
 Farm  size 




income per head 
(in thousand yen) 
Percentage of 
farm income in 
total household 
income 
              
    Total   1,911    1,693    19 
      Below 0.5 ha  436    1,763   4 
Commercial 
farm household 
 0.5-1.0  ha  673    1,786    8 
 1.0-1.5  ha     1,579    13 
     1.5-2.0  ha    1,684   22 
     2.0-3.0  ha 159    1,561   34 
      Above 3.0 ha  144    1,678   54 
                
Salaried worker 
household 
 n.a.    n.a.    1,515    n.a. 
                    
  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Statistical Survey on Farm Management and Economy, various issues; 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Family Income and Expenditure Survey, various issues. 
Note: Commercial farm households is defined as farm households whose farm size is over 0.3 hectares or whose agricultural 
revenue is over 0.5 million yen. 
Small-size farmers’ agricultural productivity is low, so they hardly earn profits from farming. This 
does not mean, however, that small-size farmers lead indigent lives. On the contrary, the average income of 
small-size farmers exceeds that of urban workers (see Table 1). This is because small-size farmers usually 
have stable nonagricultural income opportunities. Small-size farmers earn their living mainly from their 
off-farm income. In that sense, small-size farmers should be called “well-off salaried workers who own 
farmland available for side businesses.” These side businesses include not only farming but also “alchemy,” 
as will be described in detail in Section 3. 
Small-Size Farmers’ Political Power 
Why do small-size farmers dominate Japanese agriculture while being inferior to large-size farmers in 
terms of agricultural productivity? The answer to this question lies in the political dynamics of Japanese 
agriculture. This subsection describes the agricultural political dynamics that prevent the price mechanisms 
from functioning properly in the farmland market. 
Geographically, the amount of flat land is extremely limited in Japan. In particular, high-quality 
farmland, which consists of flat and well-shaped plots of paddy fields, is very limited. If a farmer wants to 
enlarge his farm, he must purchase or borrow farmland from other farmers. This means that the 
development of large-size farming inevitably breaks the structure of traditional small farming communities.  
The traditional farming community has several characteristics attractive to politicians. Traditional 
small-size farmers have cultivated the same land for generations and have strong community ties. The need 
to share irrigation water leads farmers to cooperate on issues in which they have common interests. These 
characteristics allow farmers to easily consolidate their support for politicians. 
In addition, the number of registered voters per member of the Diet (parliament) is smaller in rural 
than in urban areas. While this rural-urban disparity was reduced to some degree in the 1994 reform of the 
electoral system, rural voters still have nearly three times the voting power of their urban counterparts. This 
disparity has maintained the heavy weight of farmers’ votes.  
4984 
 
It has therefore been in the interests of politicians to maintain the structure of the traditional small 
farming community, and to obtain the electoral support of farmers. This has been the primary strategy of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled the government for almost the entire postwar period.  
The collusion between LDP politicians and farming communities also benefits the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF). MAFF has been chronically criticized for its 
extravagant personnel practices and budget.4 In order to maintain its staff and budget, MAFF requires the 
support of LDP politicians.  
A natural consequence of pricing mechanisms would be the replacement of small-size farmers by 
large-size farmers. Such a situation is undesirable for MAFF and rural politicians. Thus, MAFF and these 
politicians need a special organization to subvert the market mechanism, and this role has been filled by the 
agricultural cooperatives collectively known as Japan Agriculture (JA). JA not only lobbies politicians and 
provides services to farmers but also observes and controls members’ activities, both directly and 
indirectly.  
JA also functions as a de facto subgovernmental body that helps MAFF create and enforce policy. 
For example, many MAFF subsidies (including low-interest loans) for farmers are distributed through JA. 
Thus, MAFF does not introduce policies without considering JA’s interests. 
Figure 1. Political dynamics among farmers, politicians, MAFF, and JA 
 
The political dynamics among small-size farmers, MAFF, politicians, and JA are summarized in 
Figure 1. Since this collusion has benefited these parties at a cost to society in general, great care is taken to 
ensure that their true objectives are concealed. MAFF has always favored small farming communities in 
policymaking and policy enforcement. While simultaneously stating the promotion of large-scale farming 
as its “official” objective, MAFF policies tend to be extremely complex and ambiguous. It is thus difficult 
for consumers (and other outside interests) to be fully informed of those policies’ implications and effects. 
Likewise, JA’s structural and operational complexity has been a strategy for camouflaging its real function. 
The Agricultural Cooperative Law guarantees farmers freedom in establishing agricultural 
cooperatives, stipulating that there is no obligation for an agricultural cooperative to join the JA system and 
                                                      
4 As of 2004, the number of personnel in MAFF was nearly five times that of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. 
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that farmers are free to join or leave agricultural cooperatives as they see fit. However, under implicit 
pressures from MAFF and rural communities, almost all farmers “voluntarily” join JA or “voluntarily” 
renounce the establishment of other agricultural cooperatives.  
Many JA businesses have enjoyed heavy protection, as well as regulation, by the government. For 
instance, JA was given a monopolistic position in the collection of rice and the sale of fertilizer.  
JA’s businesses are not limited to agriculture-related activities, such as operation of joint-use 
agricultural facilities, joint shipping of agricultural commodities, joint purchasing of agricultural inputs, 
and the establishment of agricultural machinery centers; JA also provides almost all services in rural life. 
JA’s nonagricultural businesses include financial activities (banking and insurance), supermarkets, 
ceremony halls, gasoline stations, travel ticketing, and land development, and these have been increasing. 
Currently, two-thirds of JA officers are devoted to nonagricultural activities. 
Among JA’s businesses, banking and insurance services are the most profitable. Banking and 
insurance businesses had been under heavy supervision of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) up until the early 
1990s. MOF’s various regulations on the financial market prevented weak financial companies from 
collapsing. This is known as ‘the convoy system’. Under the convoy system, MOF provided particularly 
favorable treatments toward JA’s financial activities. For example, JA was given more freedom than 
ordinary commercial banks to set up branch locations, its term-deposit interest rates, and insurance 
premiums. Because of MOF’s favorable treatments, JA enjoyed stable profits from its banking and 
insurance activities. 
JA’s farming-support services are convenient for small-size farmers. Although entrepreneurial 
large-size farmers have made efforts to develop their own supply and distribution channels, traditional 
small-size farmers, who continue to make up the overwhelming majority of JA, have become more and 
more dependent on its services. Thus, despite deregulation of the market for farm products and farm inputs 
in the 1980s and 1990s, JA has maintained its market-dominant position in the supply and distribution of 
these products and inputs. 
Farmers find it difficult to avoid relying on JA services thanks to the wide scope of its operations. 
Not only small-size farmers but also large-size farmers join JA and use some of JA’s services. Even those 
who are critical of JA avoid overt opposition to the organization for fear of retaliation from both the 
organization and other farmers. For these individuals, the only realistic form of resistance is reducing their 
reliance on the organization. 6 
 
3.   FARMLAND ALCHEMY 
The largest source of pork barreling for small-size farmers by politicians is the “alchemy” of farmland. This 
alchemy has been treated as a taboo issue by the Japanese mass media and academia, as it involves 
deep-seated and often troubling issues. Godo (2007) wrote probably the first paper in English to extensively 
discuss the alchemy of farmland in Japan. The main assertion of this study can be summarized as follows. 
•  In Japan,” high quality for farming” in practice means “high potential for farmland 
conversion.” Favorable conditions for modern farming are flatness, abundance of sunlight, 
conveniently sized blocks of well-shaped plots, a good supply and drainage of water, and good 
access to roads. However, these five conditions are equally favorable for the conversion of 
farmland to nonagricultural uses such as shopping centers or public facilities. 
•  Because farmland has various externalities, such as prevention of floods, numerous laws have 
been written protecting and regulating the use of farmland. Among these, the Law concerning 
the Construction of Agricultural Promotion Areas (LCAPA) is particularly important. The 
LCAPA authorizes municipal governments to designate the zoning of Exclusively Agricultural 
Areas (EAAs). Farmers in EAAs are responsible for using farmland for farming purposes only. 
Abandonment of farmland and conversion to nonagricultural uses are prohibited. Under 
MAFF’s favorite slogan ’increase the food sufficiency rate’, MAFF allocates a large number of 
farmland improvement investments to EAAs. These investments increase not only agricultural 
productivity but also the potential for farmland conversion. In addition, farmland in EAAs 
receives favorable treatments in taxation and allocation of agricultural subsidies. 
•  On the surface, the laws regarding farmland use appear strict. In practice, however, the 
implementation of those laws is problematic. Farmland-use regulations are often manipulated 
if the authorities are subject to strong political pressure. A small-size farmer’s “ideal” scenario 
is that his farmland is initially included in an EAA so that he can enjoy agricultural subsidies 
and MAFF farmland improvement investments, as well as a reduction in asset taxes. MAFF 
investments then increase not only agricultural productivity but also the value for 
nonagricultural land use when conversion is permitted. Thus, when a farmland conversion plan 
is implemented, the farmer’s land will ideally be excluded from the EAA and the plan quickly 
approved by the local governor so that the farmer can also enjoy capital gains from his land. 
•  In order to realize this ideal scenario, small-size farmers usually join forces to pressure local 
authorities and policymakers. Although farmers cannot control critical factors, such as when 
and how a farmland conversion plan is approved, public construction projects provide the best 
conditions for land conversion. The public sector usually purchases farmland at a higher price 
than the private sector, and favorable tax treatment is granted when farmland is sold for public 
sector use. A large private development, such as a factory site or a shopping center, is 
the ”second-best” scenario, because prices tend to increase for these large-scale developments. 
As opportunities for public construction projects or large private development plans are 
limited, politicians are not always able to deliver such desirable opportunities to their farming 
constituents. However, in the long run, the possibility of securing a desirable land conversion 
can increase if these politicians continue their lobbying efforts. 
•  An overwhelming majority of farmland owners (i.e., small-size farmers) are more concerned 
with deriving capital gains from land conversions than making profits from farming. They 
prefer to maintain the structure of traditional small farming communities because it is favorable 
for forming good connections (including informal connections) with government authorities 
and policymakers. 
•  The ideal scenario also increases the national budget for farmland investments and public 
construction works, thus benefiting MAFF, which manages rural public construction works. 7 
 
Thus, MAFF welcomes the ideal scenario. MAFF turns blind eye to the manipulation of 
farmland use regulations. Obviously the ideal scenario contaradicts with MAFF’s 
slogan ”increase the food sufficiency rate”, MAFF need to hide the realities of farmland use 
regulations from the eyes of consumers (otherwise, MAFF will face difficulties in maintaining 
its etravagant fiscal expenditures). To do so, MAFF makes the system of farmland use 
regulations complexed so that outsiders cannot detect the realities. 
•  Since the ideal scenario is based on extensive collusion between small-size farmers and 
politicians, the expectation of the ideal scenario increases JA’s presence in rural political 
dynamics. In addition, small-scale farmers who receive proceeds from the sale of farmland 
usually shift these monies to their JA accounts, producing more profit for JA’s banking 
businesses. Thus, JA also encourages the ideal scenario. 
 8 
 
4.   RICE POLICY 
Political Importance of Rice 
Even if small-size farmers do not earn profits from it, they still try to keep farming for two reasons. First, 
asset taxes are low as long as they keep farming. Second, by keeping their commitment to water usage in the 
rural community, they can maintain close relationships with other farmers, which in turn is necessary to 
maintain their solidarity as a voting group.  
Simultaneously, however, small-size farmers tend not to devote a great deal of time to farming, 
because they earn their living mainly from off-farm income. Thus, small-size farmers need a crop that can 
be grown with minimum labor inputs. In Japan, that crop is rice. Labor-saving technologies (such as 
agricultural machinery, agricultural chemicals, and irrigation systems) are developed mostly for rice 
farming. In addition, MAFF provides subsidies for JA’s construction of joint-use facilities for rice farming. 
These facilities help part-time farmers, whose farms are too small to include individual rice milling and 
storage facilities.  
Politicians demonstrate their allegiance to small-size farmers by displaying their efforts to protect 
rice, thus explaining why Japanese politicians are extremely sensitive to rice policy.  
Government-Led Rice Production Cartel   
In addition to heavy border protection for rice and various subsidies for rice farming, MAFF supported a 
special program aimed at supporting rice prices, the across-the-board set-aside program. This program, 
considered a government-led rice production cartel, was first established in 1970. Every year, MAFF set a 
target acreage of paddy fields to be diverted from rice planting so as to curtail rice production. The target 
acreage was allocated among all villages in Japan. All farmers in the villages collaborated to achieve the 
allocated acreages under JA’s guidance and supervision. Around one-third of paddy field was diverted from 
rice planting. Farmers grew alternative crops, such as wheat, soy, and vegetables, which were less 
profitable, in the diverted paddy fields. MAFF provided financial support to rice farmers according to the 
acreage diverted from rice planting; it did not fully compensate for the reduction of rice income at the farm 
household level. Yet in the aggregate, the cartel effect of the across-the-board set-aside program benefited 
rice farmers by maintaining high rice prices. Thus, JA’s ability to ensure the support of rice farmers was 
critically important to enact the across-the-board set-aside program. Under this program, around 20 to 40 
percent of paddy field was diverted from rice planting. 
From 1970 to 1994, MAFF did not have any written laws for carrying out the set-aside program. 
Instead of written laws, MAFF’s administrative guidance, which had no legal legitimacy, coordinated the 
set-aside program. The Staple Food Law of 1995 was the first written law that stipulated the set-aside 
program. The Staple Food Law leaves farmers to make decisions as to whether to participate in the set-aside 
program. But the law did not make practical changes in the program. Persuaded by MAFF and JA, all the 
rice farmers joined the set-aside program from 1970 to 2006. But, as will be discussed below, it became 
increasingly difficult to convince farmers to do so, and this led to an extensive revision of the set-aside 
program in the 2007 reform.  
MAFF’s Intervention in the Domestic Rice Market 
For Japanese consumers, rice is the staple food. Although the average household spends only 1 percent of 
its expenditures on rice, rice is included in every meal. Japanese eat rice steamed, without any spices or 
condiments. Because of this cooking style, Japanese consumers are sensitive to the quality of rice. 
Top-quality rice is often considered suitable as a gift, and is sold as such in Japanese department stores, 
while low-quality rice is used for inexpensive meals.  
MAFF has a long history of rice market intervention. Until 1995, the Food Control Law controlled 
the distribution of rice. According to the Food Control Law, farmers had only two legal ways to sell rice. 9 
 
One was as “government rice,” and the other was as “voluntary rice.” The former was purchased by MAFF 
at government-set prices (which differ depending on the shape and weight of the grain). The latter was 
purchased by JA at market price. In both cases, market channels were strictly controlled under the law.  
Farmers then determined how to sell their rice. Generally, high-quality rice was sold as voluntary 
rice and low-quality rice was sold as government rice. Since MAFF determined the procurement price for 
government rice before the harvest season, the percentage of government rice tended to increase in bumper 
years, when the market price sank.  
All rice traders and rice market channels were required to be authorized under the Food Control 
Law. In practice, however, there was a significant amount of “illegal rice” (so-called freed rice) that 
circumvented the law. This is because the legal rice distribution system (as stipulated by the Food Control 
Law) was too rigid to meet consumers’ changing preferences. In particular, top-quality rice sold at higher 
prices in the illegal rice market. A significant number of farmers and consumers ignored the Food Control 
Law in favor of illegal rice, and MAFF also turned a blind eye to its purchase and sale.  
In 1995, MAFF replaced the Food Control Law with the Staple Food Law, which legalized freed 
rice. The classifications of government rice, voluntary rice, and freed rice remained until 2005, when 
MAFF abolished these classifications altogether. While MAFF continued to procure rice for buffer stock, 
distribution was allowed on a commercial basis without MAFF’s administrative interventions.  
Figure 2 shows the volumes of those three types of rice, that is, government, voluntary, and freed 
rice. As can be seen, government rice had been losing importance in the rice market since the introduction 
of voluntary rice in 1969. The percentage of government rice went down to less than 20 percent by the end 
of the 1980s.  

























































































5.   THE 2007 REFORM 
Until the early 1990s, the political ties between politicians, small-size farmers, JA, and MAFF remained 
strong. However, there was a turning point in Japan's political dynamics in the middle of the 1990s, which 
was brought on by two factors.  
First, JA’s the financial services faced an increasingly harsh business climate. MOF implemented 
financial market liberalization in the mid-1990s, which deprived JA’s banking and insurance businesses of 
various privileges. As JA’s banking and insurance businesses had been strongly protected in the financial 
markets, financial market liberalization profoundly damaged JA’s profitability. Second, the reform of the 
lower house election system in 1994 reduced the voting power of JA. In the 1994 election reform, the 
former multi-seat system was replaced with the single-seat system. Before the 1994 election reform, JA was 
proud of its crafty techniques of dividing votes to different lawmakers in a single constituency. In the 
former multi-seat system, LDP needed to have a plural number of politicians elected in a single 
constituency in order to stay power. Thus, JA’s technique of dividing votes was so attractive that LDP 
signaled its strong allegiance to JA. However, under the new single-seat system, JA’s such technique 
became useless any more. Accordingly, JA’s political voice became less influential. In addition, the 1994 
election reform allocated less seats to rural areas. This also reduced JA’s voting power.  
These two factors seriously undermined JA’s political power and, accordingly, organizing ability. 
As a result, each year it became more difficult for JA to persuade all rice farmers to join the 
across-the-board set-aside program. It was thus only a matter of time before MAFF would be forced to 
implement a comprehensive revision of its rice policy.  
An extensive agricultural policy reform was ultimately launched in 2007. The 2007 MAFF reform 
can be characterized by two aspects. First, the set-aside program was completely changed from the former 
compulsory across-the-board set-aside program to the voluntary set-aside program. This revision left it 
entirely to individual farmers’ discretion whether to participate in the set-aside program in exchange for 
receiving subsidies or to grow rice freely by giving up subsidies.  
Subsidies for the set-aside policy were also revised. The 2007 reform marked the first introduction 
of direct-payment subsidies on a large scale. Price support subsidies for wheat, barley, potatoes, soybeans, 
and sugar beets, the five primary farm products grown in paddy fields set aside from rice farming, were 
replaced by direct-payment subsidies. Some of the new direct-payment subsidies are based on average 
agricultural production in the base years 2004–2006, while others are directly linked to agricultural 
production.  
Moreover, Japan’s direct-payment subsidies are unique in that there is an additional prerequisite for 
recipients. These recipients must be core farmers. Core farmers are those designated by the municipal 
governments as the bearers of local agriculture. More precisely, there are two types of core farmers: 
individual-type core farmers and group-type core farmers. The former are either individual farm 
households whose farm size is over 4 hectares. The latter are agricultural farming groups composed of 
farmers in the same community to form over-20-hectare joint-farming groups. Theoretically, any economic 
entity is allowed to organize group-type core farmers; in practice, however, only JA does so. This is because 
the paperwork for group-type core farmers’ applications is too complicated for outsiders to compile. (JA’s 
close relationship with MAFF allows JA to easily complete all paperwork.) 
Why do new direct-payment subsidies focus only on core farmers? According to its official 
announcements, MAFF aims to raise agricultural productivity by promoting large-size farming through the 
concentration of agricultural subsidies in core farmers. However, these announcements should be read with 
caution. For example, it is unclear whether farming groups organized by JA are actually efficient. JA’s 
farming groups are sometimes nothing more than patchworks of small-size farmers. Without making 
substantial changes in practice, JA is known to organize small-size farmers into farming groups for the sole 
purpose of receiving subsidies, to the benefit of both parties. Obviously, this is the case of mistaking the 
means (creating farming groups) for the ends (receiving subsidies). Even worse is the fact that JA deprives 
tenant farmland to individual large-size farmers by persuading farmland owners who hitherto loaned 11 
 
farmland to individual large-size farmers to instead join JA’s farming groups. This is called deprivation and 
confounds individual large-size farmers who have actual high productivity.  
In sum, the 2007 reform supports JA’s efforts to maintain its organizing ability by giving incentives 
to farmers to participate in farming groups organized by JA. Thus, it is unclear whether the 2007 reform will 
in fact improve the productivity of Japanese agriculture.  
The 2007 reform has another serious problem. While the real effect of this reform will be a major 
topic of future empirical studies, there are good reasons to believe that it can stimulate agricultural 
production by contradicting the original purpose of “reform.” Clearly, the 2007 reform stimulated rice 
production because farmers were allowed to depart from the set-aside program. In particular, small-size 
farmers who hold farmland in expectation of capital gains from farmland conversions, and therefore are 
unconcerned with farm income, have surged into rice production because rice is the most labor-saving crop. 
As a result, rice prices declined sharply in 2007. Even for farmers who joined the voluntary set-aside 
program, the 2007 reform stimulated the production of wheat, barley, potatoes, and sugar beets, because the 
farmers anticipated a shift in the base year production. Currently, the average production of the three years 
2004–2006 is used for direct-payment subsidies. However, farmers expect that the base year will be 
updated in the near future,5 stimulating the production of these four crops in paddy fields set aside from 
growing rice.  
                                                      
5 See Hart and Beghin (2006) for discussion of this effect. 12 
 
6.  JAPAN’S NOTIFICATIONS OF DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL   
SUPPORT POLICIES 
The WTO sets rules for capping and reducing trade-distorting domestic agricultural support. Domestic 
support policies are divided into three boxes—amber, blue, and green—depending on the effects on 
production and trade. Non-trade-distorting policies are put into the green box and were exempt from 
reduction commitments. Further exemptions fall into the blue box, including production-limiting policies 
that base payments on fixed yields and acreage. Japan’s first blue box program was introduced in 1998, but 
government expenditures for the blue box program have remained at an insignificant level thus far. All 
other trade-distorting support policies are put into the amber box. Developed countries committed to reduce 
the total value of these policies by 20 percent, as measured by the AMS, during the implementation period. 
However, product-specific domestic support that does not exceed 5 percent of the total value of production 
of a basic agricultural product and non-product-specific domestic support that does not exceed 5 percent of 
the value of the total production are not required to be included in the AMS. (These amounts are called de 
minimis.)  
Following this three-box categorization, the Japanese government has submitted its notifications 
on its domestic agricultural support programs to the WTO for 1995–2005. In addition to these official 
notifications, this section presents our estimates of Japan’s “shadow” notifications for 2006–2007 in order 
to trace Japan’s most recent agricultural policy reforms. Tables 2, 3 and 4 are summaries of the official and 
shadow notifications.  
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Table 2. Japan's notifications of domestic support (in billion yen) 
   Official  Official  Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Shadow Shadow 
  Year  1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007  
Green Box  Total  3,169.0 2,818.1 2,651.7 3,001.6 2,685.9 2,595.3 2,546.9 2,275.2 2,086.3 2,098.3 1,916.3  1,875.4  1,895.1 
  (a) General service  2,687.8 2,323.5 2,182.2 2,594.2 2,308.3 2,165.7 2,094.5 1,743.3 1,603.6 1,658.9  1,465.4 1,431.3 1,308.2 
 
(b) Public stockholding for food 
security  purposes  59.9 61.5 67.3 56.6 46.8 46.4    43.3 36.3 31.9 28.2  24.5 24.6 26.9   
  (c) Domestic food aid  28.1  27.0  26.4  13.8  9.3 5.4    5.3 4.8 2.5 0.0 3.2  0.0  0.0   
  (d)  Decoupled  income  support  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 97.7   
 
(f) Payments for relief from 
natural disasters  68.3  65.8  62.0 58.6 57.9 55.5    54.1 53.6 48.3 48.0 49.0  51.5  46.9   
 
(g) Structural adjustment 
assistance provided through 
producer retirement programmes  119.4 98.6 90.9 84.9 85.4 88.3    97.6 162.7 158.1 156.5 155.8  156.0  157.2   
 
(h) Structural adjustment 
assistance provided through 
resource retirement programmes  7.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5    0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0   
 
(i) Structural adjustment 
assistance provided through 
investment aids  116.9  107.9  89.5 77.4 54.3 55.2    42.4 31.2 23.5 22.8 19.9  17.0  17.4   
  (j)  Environmental  programmes  80.7 133.3 132.9 115.6 123.4 145.3    176.3 210.2 195.4 167.1 176.7  173.2  219.0   
  
(k) Regional assistance 
programmes  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  33.0    33.0 33.0 23.0 16.8 21.8  21.8  21.8   
Blue  Box      0.0  0.0  0.0 50.2 92.7 92.7    91.1 86.5 68.2 67.8 65.3  70.1  42.4   
Amber Box  Price support  3271.3  3125.8  2967.9  641.5  619.6 503.9    389.7 404.0 405.6 403.0  394.7 406.9 373.1   
  Domestic  payment  248.7 215.5 214.7 177.9 138.8 215.4    289.1 349.1 253.1 228.9  198.6 178.9 133.2   
 
(Share of price support in total 
AMS)  93% 94% 94% 84% 83% 71% 58% 55% 63% 66% 67%  74%  79% 
  (De  minimis)  12.5 11.4 11.7 53.1 10.4 10.8    12.0 23.2 16.9 24.1  41.3 32.9 34.7   
Current Total AMS  3,507.5  3,329.7  3,170.8 766.5 747.8 708.5    666.7 730.0 641.8 607.8 593.3  593.3  471.6   
(Commitment)  4,800.6 4,635.0 4,469.5 4,304.0 4,138.4 3,972.9 3,972.9 3,972.9 3,972.9 3,972.9  3,972.9 3,972.9 3,972.9 
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Table 3. Japan's green box programs (in billion yen) 
  Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Shadow Shadow 
Name and description of measure with 
reference to criteria in Annex 2  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Research:  84.9 65.3 66.0 87.5 82.1 82.8 89.7 90.5 83.9 85.1 86.8 78.6 74.5 
Plant protection:  10.0 10.1 10.4 10.7 10.4 11.5 11.1 11.0 11.9 11.2 10.9 11.3 12.0 
Animal health control:  6.1 4.7 4.8 8.6 5.3 6.7 6.1 9.1 6.0 6.8 7.1 8.6 9.1 
Extension services:  49.8 49.1 57.0 42.9 40.7 39.8 41.3 40.6 36.5 27.9 24.2  4.9  4.9 
Facilitation of management of agricultural 
organizations:  77.0 69.9 65.0 70.8 72.8 69.3 64.1 62.6 58.9 57.7 57.8 48.3 47.0 
Compilation of statistical data and 
information:  6.1 6.1 5.4 5.4 7.2 8.2 8.4 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.5 4.2 3.0 
Promotion of soil conservation and 
low-input farming:  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  - - - - - - - - 
Extension and infrastructural services for 
technological improvement of agricultural 
production: 
50.6 47.0 48.3 71.7 59.0 49.4 37.1 51.5 21.7 16.3 50.2 15.3 14.3 
General services for livestock industry 
including extension and infrastructure:  101.3 85.0  97.1 123.7 97.6 133.5  189.7 105.0 107.8  93.9  58.5  77.3  68.9 
Programmes for improvement of food 
marketing, processing and consumption:  21.1 17.1 16.8 19.9 20.3 20.4 17.7 14.8 10.2 10.2 10.2 11.7  7.6 
Inspection and information services for 
agricultural production materials:  9.6 7.9 8.1 9.5 8.4 9.2  10.0  9.6 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.6 1.6 
Infrastructural services for agricultural 
sector and rural area:  1,907.9 1,680.8 1,487.7 1,800.7 1,552.4 1,428.4 1,342.4 1,067.6  950.7 909.9 840.0 854.0 800.6 
Disaster rehabilitation services:  111.5  36.4 70.3 92.7 87.2 54.0 30.7 21.6 32.3  112.5  41.6 46.8  8.1 
Infrastructural services for market facilities:  20.1 12.4 10.4 21.4 13.8  9.9  8.3 6.8 5.7 6.0  -  11.6  12.5 
Advisory services for structural 
improvement:  48.3 53.4 54.9 49.3 51.8 44.8 47.1 51.0 48.6 57.9 34.7  9.6  9.3 
Personnel expenses for the Government 
officials:  183.0 177.8 179.5 179.0 198.9 197.8 190.8 195.2 220.1 254.0 233.5 247.5 234.8 
Public stockholding:  59.9 61.5 67.3 56.6 46.8 46.4 43.3 36.3 31.9 28.2 24.5 24.6 26.9 
School lunch programmes:  28.1 27.0 26.4 13.8  9.3  5.4  5.3 4.8 2.5 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 
Cross-commodity income stabilization 
based on historical acres:  - - - - - - - - - - - -  97.7 
Agricultural insurance scheme:  66.4 64.5 61.2 58.1 57.6 55.3 54.0 53.6 48.3 47.8 48.9 51.5 46.9 
Natural disaster relief loans:  1.9 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Farmers' pension programmes:  117.6  98.4 90.7 84.9 85.4 88.3 97.6  162.7 158.1 156.5 155.8 156.0 157.2 
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Table 3. Continued 
 Official  Official  Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Official Shadow Shadow 
Name and description of measure with 
reference to criteria in Annex 2  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Land retirement programmes for citrus 
production:  1.8  0.2  0.2  - - - - - - - - - - 
Programmes for reduction of number of livestock:  7.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0  -  -  -  - 
Agricultural loans:  116.9  107.9  89.5 77.4 54.3 55.2 42.4 31.2 23.5 22.8 19.9 17.0 17.4 
Payments for conversion from rice production:  80.7  133.3 132.9 115.6 116.7 136.2 166.7 200.6 185.8 158.8 168.4 166.5 212.4 
Support programme for reduction of 
environmental burden due to dairy farming:    -  -  -  -  6.7 9.1 9.6 9.6 9.6 8.3 8.3 6.7 6.6 
Direct payment to farmers in the hilly and 
mountainous areas:    - - - - -  33.0  33.0  33.0  23.0  16.8  21.8  21.8  21.8 
   3,169.0 2,818.1 2,651.7 3,001.6 2,685.9 2,595.3 2,546.9 2,275.2 2,086.3 2,098.3 1,916.3 1,875.4 1,895.1   16  
Table 4. Name and description of the green box programs 
Measure Type 
Name and description of measure 
with reference to criteria in Annex 2             
(a)  General 
services 
Research:  General research, research in connection with environmental 
programmes, and research programmes relating to particular 
products.  
   Plant protection:  General and product-specific pest and disease control 
measures.  
   Animal health control:  General and product-specific animal health control for 
livestock and animal medicine inspection. 
   Extension services:  Education, extension and advisory services, and programmes 
for practical application of new technologies. 
   Facilitation of management of 
agricultural organizations: 
Facilitation of training and advisory services through 
agricultural organizations. 
   Compilation of statistical data and 
information: 
Compilation and provision of statistical data and information 
for producers and consumers.  
   Promotion of soil conservation and 
low-input farming: 
Extension and advisory services, research programmes for 
soil conservation and low-input farming.  
   Extension and infrastructural services 
for technological improvement of 
agricultural production: 
Extension and advisory services, research programmes, and 
infrastructural services for technological improvement of 
agricultural production.  
   General services for livestock industry 
including extension and infrastructure: 
Infrastructural services, extension and advisory services on 
technologies, and information services for promotion of 
livestock products.  
   Programmes for improvement of food 
marketing, processing and 
consumption: 
Providing marketing information to consumers, research 
related to food or agricultural products processing, marketing 
promotion, and inspection.  
   Inspection and information services for 
agricultural production materials: 
Inspection, research, extension and advisory services for 
agricultural machinery, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, 
seeds and seedlings.  
 
Measure Type 
Name and description of measure 
with reference to criteria in Annex 2             
  
Infrastructural services for agricultural 
sector and rural area: 
Construction of irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads, 
land consolidation.  
   Disaster rehabilitation services: 
Reconstruction of irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads 
damaged by natural disasters. 
  
Infrastructural services for market 
facilities:  Provision or construction of market facilities.  
  
Advisory services for structural 
improvement:  Advisory services for effective farm land utilization. 
  
Personnel expenses for the Government 




purposes Public  stockholding: 
Public stockholding of rice, wheat, barley, soya beans and 
feedgrains. 
(c) Domestic 
food aid  School lunch programmes: 




Cross-commodity income stabilization 
based on historical acres: 
Decoupled income support based on historical acres for 
farmers harvesting soybeans, wheat, barley, sugar cane and 
potato for starch   17  
Table 4. Continued 
Measure Type 
Name and description of measure 
with reference to criteria in Annex 2             
(f) Payments for 
relief from 
natural disasters 
Agricultural insurance scheme:  Government subsidies on premiums of agricultural 
insurance.  








Farmers' pension programmes:  Payments of pension to retired farmers on condition of 
transfer of the management.  
   Land retirement programmes for citrus 
production: 
Payments for land retirement from citrus production to 
adjust to changes in supply and demand situation caused 








Programmes for reduction of number of 
livestock: 
Payments for slaughtering of sow and cow to avoid 






Agricultural loans:  Interest concessions for government programmed 




Payments for conversion from rice 
production: 
Payments for maintaining paddy fields in environmentally 
good condition through growing any plants other than rice 
or other appropriate managements.  
  
   Support programme for reduction of 
environmental burden due to dairy 
farming:   
Payments to dairy farmers who practice appropriate 





Direct payment to farmers in the hilly 
and mountainous areas:   
Payments for farmers who continue farming activities for at 




The first part of this subsection outlines an estimation procedure for shadow notifications. The details of our 
estimation and projection procedures for the shadow notifications are available in the appendix of this 
paper.  
We first tried to replicate the 2004 and 2005 data; however, the official documents do not provide 
any information on data sources and details of calculation. Thus, we had to make a best guess based on the 
financial statements of the government and relevant extra-governmental organizations. Fortunately, we 
succeeded in replicating de minimis, AMS, and the amber and blue boxes for 2004 almost completely. 
Based on this replication process, we prepared shadow notifications for de minimis, AMS, and the blue and 
amber boxes for 2006 with little difficulty. Estimation for 2007, however, is problematic for two reasons. 
First, some data on crop production and fiscal expenditures are yet not available. For crop production, 
which is necessary to calculate AMS, we used the data for 2006 in place of data for 2007. For fiscal   18  
expenditures, we used provisional figures of accounts in place of the settlement of accounts. Another and 
more critical problem in estimation for 2007 is the treatment of the new direct-payment subsidies 
introduced in the 2007 reform. The Japanese government has not made any official announcements on how 
the new subsidies should be classified. As mentioned in the previous section, some are base year 
production-based subsidies that should be in the green box, and some are annual production-based 
subsidies that should be in the amber box. However, there are “gray zones” in characterizing the new 
subsidies. We made a best guess based on various governmental documents and prepared data for 2007. 
However, we admit that the estimates for 2007 are less accurate than those for 2006.  
The green box was more difficult to replicate. From the government report on the national budget, 
we can find items of expenditure that seem to correspond to the components in the official notifications. 
However, there are gaps between them. For example, “extension and advisory services, research 
programmes and infrastructural services for technological improvement of agricultural production” in the 
government report on the national budget seems to correspond to “extension and infrastructural services for 
technological improvement of agricultural production” in Japan’s official notification. However, the 
expenditure of the former is 44 percent larger than that of the latter. This is because the former includes the 
personnel expenses of officers who are not engaged in extension services. In Japan’s official notifications, 
the Japanese government calculates components of the green box based on data for insiders only. We thus 
estimated “extension and infrastructural services for technological improvement of agricultural production” 
by dividing “extension and advisory services, research programmes, and infrastructural services for 
technological improvement of agricultural production” by 1.44 (144 percent) for 2006 and 2007. Likewise, 
we estimated all components of the green box for 2006 and 2007.  
Characteristics of Japan’s Green Box   
Most noticeably, “infrastructural services for the agricultural sector and rural areas” under General Services 
makes up the largest portion of the green box (see Tables 3 and 4). This expenditure corresponds to MAFF 
public construction works, such as farmland improvement investments and construction of rural roads. As 
discussed in Section 3, these construction works are the most welcomed program for small-size farmers, 
who own farmland with the expectation of future capital gain and are unwilling to work long hours at 
farming. 
Traditionally, the Japanese government has used public construction works as an antirecession 
fiscal policy. This is why expenditure for infrastructural services for agricultural sector and rural area 
surged in 1998, when the Japanese economy plunged into the worst economic slump since the oil crises of 
the 1970s. However, in response to increasing criticism of public construction by Japanese citizens, the 
national budgets for infrastructural services for agricultural sector and rural area have been decreasing since 
then. In particular, from 2001 to 2005, when Prime Minister Koizumi—who gained popularity by posing as 
a dauntless reformer—was in power, the budgets for public construction works were severely rolled back.  
According to the reduction of expenditures for infrastructural services for agricultural sector and 
rural area, the total amount of the green box also decreased during this period. “Environmental 
programmes” increased by 50 billion yen in 2007 in response to the MAFF reforms. However, since 
infrastructural services for agricultural sector and rural area kept declining, the total amount of the green 
box did not change much between 2006 and 2007.  
“Environmental programme” corresponds to the subsidy for rice set-aside program. Farmers who 
join the set-aside program receive subsidies according to the acreage of paddy field diverted from rice 
planting. This acreage-base subsidy program is classified as “environmental programme”. It is unclear 
whether this program has any effects for protecting environment. In spite of such unclearness, however, 
WTO accepts this treatment.    19  
Characteristics of Japan’s Amber Box   
When WTO started in 1995, Japan had amber box programs for rice, soybeans, wheat, barley, sugar, starch, 
beef and veal, meat of swine, and silk-worm cocoons. From 1995 to 1997, Japan’s amber box had been 
close to its commitment level.  
In 1998, Japan’s amber box decreased significantly because rice was removed from the amber box 
in that year. Interestingly, there was no corresponding revision in the Staple Food Law, and MAFF 
continued to procure rice from farmers at administrative prices even after 1998. However, in its 1998 policy 
guideline, MAFF announced that government rice procurement should be limited to purchase of rice stocks 
for food security, thus indicating the removal of rice from the amber box. We (as well as an overwhelming 
majority of Japanese researchers) are skeptical of whether MAFF’s new guideline of 1998 had any practical 
meaning. In fact, even after 1998, MAFF’s procurement of rice has been occasionally done for the political 
purpose of supporting rice price. A typical example appeared in 2007. While MAFF’s rice stock was 
already at a sufficient level for the purpose of food security, MAFF decided to increase rice stock after 
receiving strong pressure from LDP politicians who wanted to get in favor with farmers6. In this case, 
MAFF’s rice procurement can be seen as a de facto market price support measure. Thus, there is enough 
ground for controversy about whether MAFF’s rice procurement should be regarded as the green box 
measure.  
In addition, since Japan’s rice is protected by prohibitively high tariffs, abandonment of the 
administrative price may not reduce real protections for rice.7  
However, we also recognize that MAFF’s intervention in the rice market had been getting less and 
less effective after MAFF introduced voluntary rice in 1969. MAFF’s rice procurement (i.e., government 
rice) had been decreasing throughout these three decades (see Figure 2). Thus, even though there was not a 
clear-cut turning-point year (such as 1998), Japan needed to remove rice from the amber box at some time. 
In computing the AMS for 1995–1997, Japan used the total production of rice as “eligible 
production.” In the latter half of the 1990s, however, government rice made up less than 5 percent of total 
rice production. This is why the box shifting of rice did not make any significant increase in the total 
monetary value of green box in 1998. 
Amber box support decreased by 80 billion yen in 2007 in response to MAFF reforms. De minimis 
made up only a limited portion of the amber box. Thus, there is little difference between AMS and current 
AMS throughout 1995–2007.  
Characteristics of Japan’s Blue Box   
Japan had no blue box program when the Uruguay Round final agreements were concluded. The Rice 
Farming Income Stabilization Program (RFISP), which was implemented in 1998, was the first blue box 
program in Japan. RFISP can be seen as a countercyclical program. It stipulates that, if the market rice price 
falls below the average rice price of the previous three years, MAFF will provide income supports for 
farmers who join the set-aside program. As described above, almost all the rice farmers “voluntarily” 
participated in the set-aside program in 1998. RFISP seems inconsistent with the fact that MAFF continued 
procuring rice at administrative prices (i.e., government rice) even after the enactment of the Staple Food 
Law. A possible rationalization for RFISP is that with the government rice share only a limited portion of 
the rice market, the administrative prices do not significantly influence market rice prices. Indeed, an 
overwhelming majority of rice was distributed as either freed rice or voluntary rice at market prices in the 
latter half of the 1990s (see Figure 2). It may not be a coincidence that Japan reported removal of rice from 
the amber box in the same year RFISP was implemented.  
In 2007, RFISP was replaced by the Program for Rice Farming Structural Reform. This new 
program is scheduled to terminate in 2010.  
                                                      
6 See page 5 in the morning paper of Nikkei as of October 26th, 2007.  
7 See Blandford and Josling (2007) for discussion.   20  
Projections of Domestic Support Notifications, 2008–2015 
Understandably, it is difficult to make projections of domestic policy eight years in the future. We estimated 
Japan’s future expenditures for domestic agricultural supports by taking trends and/or the average of 
Japan’s past expenditures from 2002 to 2006. For agricultural commodities whose market prices are 
supported by MAFF, we made projections of production levels and prices by taking five-year trends from 
2002 to 2006. Then we estimated amounts of market price supports for 2008–2015 by multiplying projected 
production and prices. For some expenditures that are under strong pressure of cutbacks from the Ministry 
of Finance, we extrapolated by taking five-year trends for 2002–2006. For others, we assume that annual 
expenditures for 2008–2015 will be the same as the averages of 2002–2006. For programs that will be 
newly implemented in 2008 and for programs whose duration is already stipulated, we made special 
treatments based on MAFF’s announcements.  
Our estimates for 2008–2015 are summarized in Table 5. We expect that Japan’s domestic supports 
will keep declining till 2015. Of course, there are some uncertain elements. One of them is the possibility of 
a drastic reduction in border protection for agricultural commodities. Japan imposes high border protections 
for agricultural commodities, protections that are severely criticized in the international arena. If the 
Japanese government is forced to conclude an international agreement reducing border protection for 
agricultural commodities, the Japanese farmers, who form one of the strongest voting groups in Japan, will 
press the government for compensation programs, which should be accompanied with increases in fiscal 
expenditures. However, this kind of uncertain element is so difficult to predict that we simply took trends 
and averages of 2002–2006 data, as mentioned above.  
Table 5. Projected notifications of Japan's domestic support, 2008-2015 (in billion yen) 
  Year  2008 2009 2010 2011    2012    2013 2014 2015 
Green Box  Total  1,905 1,912 1,889 1,868    1,842    1,816 1,791 1,765 
  (a)  General  service  1,340 1,351 1,330 1,311    1,286    1,262 1,238 1,214 
 
(b) Public stockholding for food 
security  purposes  27 27 27 27    27    27 27 27 
  (c)  Domestic  food  aid  3 3 3 3    3    3 3 3 
  (d)  Decoupled  income  support  102 100 100 100    100    100 100 100 
 
(f) Payments for relief from natural 
disasters  45 43 41 39    38    36 35 33 
 
(g) Structural adjustment assistance 
provided through producer retirement 
programmes  157 157 157 157    157    157 157 157 
 
(i) Structural adjustment assistance 
provided through investment aids 20 20 20 20    20    20 20 20 
  (j)  Environmental  programmes  189 189 189 189    189    189 189 189 
   (k) Regional assistance programmes  22  22  22  22   22   22  22  22 
Blue Box     32  31  0  0   0   0  0  0 
Amber  Box  Price  support  353 350 348 345    343    340 337 334 
  Domestic  payment  133 135 135 135    135    135 135 135 
  (share  of  price  support  in  total  AMS)  73% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 71% 71% 
    (de  minimis)  91 91 91 91    91    91 91 91 
Current Total AMS  486  485  483  480   477   475 472 469 
(Commitment)      3,973 3,973 3,973 3,973    3,973    3,973 3,973 3,973   21  
Will the Doha Round negotiations restrict Japan’s domestic support? To answer this question, we 
need to calculate Japan’s base overall trade-distorting support (OTDS) as of 2000. Adding up the Final 
Bound Total AMS, that is, 3,972.9 billion yen, and 15 percent of the total value of agricultural production 
(the average for 1995–2000), that is, 1,477.5 billion yen, we obtain 5,450.4 billion yen as the base OTDS.8 
According to the Falconer paper in July 2008, Japan’s OTDS should be reduced to less than 1,635.2 billion 
yen (0.3 x 5,450.4) by 2013. On the other hand, our projection tells that the total value of Japan’s blue and 
amber box for 2013 is 469 billion yen. Thus, the Doha Round negotiations are unlikely to restrict Japan’s 
agricultural domestic policy. 
 
                                                      
8 The monetary value of the blue box is negligible (see Table 5) so that 15 (10 + 5) percent of the total value of agricultural 
production should be applied.   22  
7.   CONCLUSION 
Japan reduced its amber box expenditures to less than 20 percent of the commitment level set in the 
Uruguay Round agreements and underwent extensive decoupling reform in 2007. These two features may 
provide an impression of Japan as a model of compliance, at least regarding domestic agricultural policies.  
This paper, however, showed two ironic realities of Japanese agricultural policy. Neither a sharp 
reduction of amber box expenditures nor Japan’s 2007 reform, characterized by decoupling, necessarily 
mean there will be a reduction of trade-distorting effects. On the contrary, the 2007 reform may in fact 
stimulate domestic rice production. 
These ironies come from the characteristics of Japanese agricultural political dynamics. Traditional 
small farming dominates Japanese agriculture, and small-size farmers are richer than their urban 
counterparts, because they depend on stable off-farm income. Small-size farmers retain possession and use 
of farmland not for the purpose of earning farm income but to obtain easy money through the political 
alchemy of farmland.  
A small number of innovative large-size farmers have high agricultural productivity. However, 
policymakers try to prevent development of large-size farms in order to protect traditional small farming 
communities, which form powerful voting groups. 
Under such political dynamics, Japan’s huge domestic agricultural support did not result in an 
oversupply of agricultural products. This is why Japan is the only country whose food self-sufficiency rate 
keeps declining in spite of its heavy agricultural protection. 
In consideration of this background, we are skeptical about the significance of the WTO three-box 
classification. At least in Japan, WTO-style domestic policy reform may not be effective for promoting 
sound development of international agricultural trade.    23  
APPENDIX:   ESTIMATION AND PROJECTION PROCEDURES FOR WTO 
NOTIFICATIONS 
1. Timing of WTO Reporting 
Idealistically, every WTO member country should update its domestic support notifications once basic 
data, such as the total production of agricultural commodities and fiscal expenditures for agricultural 
support programs, are made available. However, member countries often delay their notifications, 
ostensibly for diplomatic reasons.  
Table A.1. Timing of Japan's official notifications 
Year for which the Japan 













The Japanese government normally updates its official notifications every three to four years, as 
shown in Table A.1. At the time of writing (August 2008), Japan’s notifications were current up to 2005, 
making it one of the most punctual WTO members.  
Since there were no major changes in domestic support policies in 2006, notifications for that year 
are projected to be released in either 2008 or 2009. Notifications for 2007, however, are likely to be delayed 
in the wake of the extensive subsidy reforms enacted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) during that year (see Section 5 in the main text).  
2. MAFF’s System for Compiling Notifications 
In order to clarify the details of the notification computation process, we conducted interviews with officers 
of the MAFF ‘Kokusai-bu’ (Department of International Relations), the contact department for WTO 
negotiations. Our interviews revealed that the Kokusai-bu is not directly responsible for computing 
monetary values of domestic support measures; instead, it allocates computation to the various MAFF 
departments that manage fiscal expenditures. The Kokusai-bu then collects and compiles these results to 
conform to the WTO notification format. The details of MAFF’s computation procedures are difficult to 
access even for Kokusai-bu officers, and are thus effectively unavailable to the general public, including 
researchers.  
Our interview with Kokusa-bu officers also revealed that the official notifications base on the 
initial budget of the national treasury. Theoretically, for the purpose of computing monetary values of 
domestic support programs, the settled account data should be more suitable than the initial budget data.   24  
However, this is not considered a serious problem because the gap between MAFF’s initial budget and 
settled account is generally small.  
3. Estimation Period of Our Shadow Notifications 
When our research project began in 2007, the Japanese government had not yet published the official 
notifications for 2005. In that time, however, expenditure data on the national budget and production and 
price data on agricultural commodities were available for up until 2007. Based on those data, we tried to 
estimate monetary values of domestic support programs for 2005-07 as our shadow notifications. After the 
official notifications for 2005 was published in 2008, we compared them with our shadow notifications for 
2005. By this comparison, we can check the accuracy of our shadow notifications.  
Estimation Procedure of Our Shadow Notifications   
(1). Amber Box 
Currently, the Japanese government has amber box programs for wheat, barley, soybeans, sugar, starch, 
beef and veal, meat of swine, and silk-worm cocoons. A sub-governmental body, the Agricultural and 
Livestock Industries Cooperation (ALIC), is also engaged in amber box programs for sugar, starch, beef 
and veal, meat of swine and silk-worm cocoons. 
There are two types of amber box policies: ‘non exempt direct payment’, which is calculated from 
budgetary outlays and foregone revenue to the government, and ‘market price support’, which is calculated 
from the product of the difference between the fixed eternal reference price and the applied administered 
price of the program and the quantity of production eligible under the program: namely,  
 
monetary value of market price support program 
= (administered price – external reference price) x (eligible production). 
 
here, external reference price is the import CIF price at the Uruguay Round base period (1986-88) and 
administered price is the lower boundary price set by the government (including sub-governmental bodies).  
Barley and Wheat 
The Japanese government had a market price support program for barley and wheat until 2004. Official 
notifications used the total amount of the government’s procurement of barley and wheat as ‘eligible 
production’ instead of the total amount of production when estimating the amount support. As government 
procurement was almost zero between 2000 and 2004, market price support for barley and wheat was 
negligible during this period. Finally, in 2005, the program was abolished. 
Besides the market price support program, Japan also has non-exempt direct payment for barley 
and wheat, which is reported as 105.8 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004. This is equivalent to 
the fiscal expenditure for the Wheat and Barley Farming Income Stabilization Program in the national 
budget. We used that fiscal expenditure for our shadow notifications. 
Soya Beans 
For soya beans, Japan has non-exempt direct payment but not market price support. The fiscal expenditures 
for the Soybean Farming Income Stabilization Program and the Subsidy Program for Soybean Producers in 
the national budget for 2004 totaled 27.8 billion yen. This is a close approximation of 27.6 billion yen, 
which is reported as the amber box support for soya beans in the official notifications for 2004. We used the 
total of these two expenditures for our shadow notifications. 
Sugar 
The Japanese government supports sugar production through non-exempt direct payment and market price 
support. The non-exempt direct payment for sugar in the official notifications for 2004 is 27.6 billion yen.   25  
This is equivalent to the fiscal expenditure for Nogyo Keiei Kiban Kyoka Tokubetsu Taisaku (Agricultural 
Management Framework Reinforcement Special Policy) in the national budget. We used this expenditure 
for our shadow notifications. 
For the market price support program for sugar, ALIC plays an important role. ALIC controls sugar 
imports and levies charges on sugar imports. Sugar farmers receive a grant from ALIC in addition to their 
sales at the administered price. Thus, the difference between the fixed external reference price and the 
applied administered price of the program does not capture the price support level. In order to cope with this 
problem, the official notifications employ the following equation to compute monetary value of the market 
price support for sugar. 
 
monetary value of market price support 
 = (administered price – external reference price) 
 x (producer price / administered price) x (eligible production) 
 
Price data are available in the Pocket Sugar Statistics published by Seito Kogyo Kaikan (Sugar 
Refining Industry Hall) and statistics are posted on ALIC's website. The data for the eligible production is 
available in the Crop Survey published by MAFF. 
Starch 
For starch, the Japanese government has market price support but not non-exempt direct payment. ALIC 
controls starch imports and provides grants to producers (potato farmers). The equation for starch is the 
same as that for sugar. Price and eligible production data are available on the ALIC website. 
Milk 
Milk is also subject to non-exempt direct payment only. Its monetary value in the official notifications for 
2004 is 26.7 billion yen. This is equivalent to the total of MAFF’s expenditures for Shitei Seinyu-sha Dantai 
Kofukin (Subsidy to Designated Milk Produce Organization) and ALIC’s expenditures for Kako Genryonyu 
Seisansha Keiei Antei Taisaku (Business Stabilization Policy for Manufacturing Milk Producers), Ekijo 
Nyuseihin Seisan Kakudai Jigyo (Liquid Dairy Products Production Promotion Policy), Rakuno Antei 
Tokubetsu Taisaku Jigyo (Business Stabilization Special Policy for Dairy Farming), and Juyo-ki Seinyu 
Seisan Suishin Taisaku (Summertime Milk Production Promotion Policy). These expenditures are reported 
in the national budget and on the ALIC website. We used these five expenditures for our shadow 
notifications. 
Beef and Veal 
Both non-exempt direct payment and market price support are applied to beef and veal. 
The monetary value of the non-exempt direct payment for beef and veal in the official notifications 
for 2004 is 41.1 billion yen. This is equivalent to the total of ALIC’s expenditures for Nikuyo Koushi 
Seisansha Hokyukin Seido (Subsidy Program for Beef Calve Farmers) and Nikuyogyu Hi-iku Keiei Antei 
Taisaku (Business Stabilization Policy), as reported on the ALIC website. We used these two expenditures 
for our shadow notifications. 
ALIC’s price stabilization program for beef and veal falls under market price support in the WTO’s 
classification. ALIC sets the lower and upper boundary prices for beef and veal, buying when the market 
price is lower than the lower boundary price, and selling when the market price is higher than the upper 
boundary price. The lower boundary price for dressed carcass of beef cattle is used as the administered 
price. The eligible production is the total amount of carcass from adult beef cattle, Japanese veal calves and 
dairy veal calves. These price and production data are available from MAFF Statistical Yearbook. 
Meat of Swine 
The system of market price support for meat of swine is similar to that for beef and veal. The non-exempt 
direct payment for meat of swine in the official notifications (0.3 billion yen) is equivalent to ALIC’s 
expenditure for Chi-iki Niku-ton Seisan Antei Kikin Zosei Jigyo (Funding Program for Production   26  
Stabilization Foundation for Local Hogs) as reported on the ALIC website. The administered price is also 
the lower boundary price, and the eligible production is the total amount of pork carcass; price and 
production data are available from MAFF Statistical Yearbook. 
Silk-Worm Cocoons 
Silk-worm cocoons are eligible for both non-exempt direct payment and market price support. The 
monetary value of the non-exempt direct payment in the official notifications for 2004 is 1.1 billion yen. 
This is equivalent to the fiscal expenditure for Sanshi-gyo Keiei Antei Taisaku (Sericulture Business 
Stabilization Policy) reported on the ALIC website. According to the official notifications, the administered 
price for silk-worm cocoons has remained constant at 100,000 yen per ton since 2002; however, it is unclear 
where this price data (i.e., 100,000 yen per ton) originates. Despite this uncertainty, we consider 100,000 
yen per ton suitable for the administered price for our shadow notifications. The eligible production is the 
total amount of silk thread as reported by MAFF. 
The framework of the amber box programs remained unchanged between 2004 and 2006. Thus, we 
estimated monetary values of non-exempt direct payment programs for our shadow notifications for 2005 
and 2006 based on the estimation procedures mentioned above. For market price support programs, 
however, some of the data for eligible production were not published yet when we prepared this paper. In 
such cases, we estimated eligible production based on trends of the corresponding agricultural 
commodities.  
In 2007, market price support programs for wheat, barley, starch, soya beans and sugar were 
replaced by a cross-commodity subsidy program (see Section 5 in the main text). This new subsidy can be 
seen as a mixture of exempt and non-exempt direct payments (i.e., a mixture of green and amber boxes). 
The Japanese government has not made any formal announcement about how this new subsidy should be 
treated in WTO notifications. Studying MAFF’s guidebooks for the new subsidy, however, we decomposed 
this new subsidy into two parts: eligible direct payment (green box) and non-eligible direct payment (amber 
box).  
(2) De minimis 
In 2004, the following four programs were reported as ‘commodity-specific’ de minimis and one program 
was reported as ‘non-commodity-specific’ de minimis: rice (7.5 billion yen), egg (1.3 billion yen), 
vegetables (14.1 billion yen), fruits (1.2 billion yen), and agricultural insurance (18.1 billion yen). De 
minimis values for rice, egg, and fruits can be obtained from fiscal expenditures reported in the national 
budget; e.g., 7.5 billion yen of rice is equivalent to the fiscal expenditure for Kajo Mai Tanki Yushi Shikin 
Kashitsuke Kin (Funding Program for Short-term Loan for Rice Surplus), 1.2 billion yen of fruit is 
equivalent to the fiscal expenditure for Kajitsu Jukyu Antei Taisaku Jigyohi (Working Expenses for 
Stabilization Policy for Fruit Supply and Demand) in Kajitsu Seisan Shukka Antei Shikin Zosei Jigyohi 
(Working Expenses for Funding for Fruit Production and Shipping Stabilization Foundation), and 1.3 
billion yen of egg is equivalent to the fiscal expenditure for Kei-ran Kakaku Antei Taisaku-hi Hojokin 
(Subsidy for Egg Price Stabilization Policy). We used these expenditures for our shadow notifications. 
Replication of de minimis for vegetables is more difficult than those for the other three items. This 
is because local governments, in addition to MAFF, are engaged in price support for vegetables. MAFF’s 
expenditures for vegetable price support in 2004, based on the Yasai Kakaku Antei Taisaku-hi Hojokin 
(Subsidy for Vegetable Price Stabilization Policy) and Yasai Jukyu Kinko Sogo Suishin-hi (Subsidy for 
Comprehensive Policy for Vegetable Demand-Supply Adjustment) in the national budget, was 9.3 billion 
yen. However, it is difficult to collect data on local government expenditures for vegetable price support. 
Instead of collecting such data, we obtained the total expenditures of local governments’ price support for 
vegetables for 2004 by taking a back-calculation. That is, by subtracting MAFF’s expenditure from de 
minimis for vegetables, we obtained local governments’ de minimus for vegetables for 2004 as 4.8 billion 
yen (=14.1 billion yen - 9.3 billion yen). Then, assuming that the ratio between MAFF and local 
government expenditures was constant between 2004 and 2007, we estimated shadow de minimis for 
vegetables from Yasai Kakaku Antei Taisaku-hi Hojokin and Yasai Jukyu Kinko Sogo Suishin-hi.    27  
We could not figure out the data sources for de minimis for agricultural insurance. For our shadow 
notifications, we assumed that de minimis for agricultural insurance for 2006-07 was the same as the 
average for 2003-05. 
(3) Blue Box  
The blue box in Japan’s official notifications for 2004 is 67.8 billion yen. This is equivalent to the total of 
the expenditures for Inasaku Shotoku Kiban Kakuho Taisaku (Rice Farming Income Stabilization 
Programs) and Ninai-te Keiei Antei Taisaku (Business Stabilization Policy for Farm Units with Approved 
Municipal Management Improvement Plans), which are reported in the national budget. We used the total 
of the two expenditures for our shadow blue box estimations for 2005-06. 
In 2007, MAFF consolidated these two blue box programs into a new one. Inasaku Kozo Kaikaku 
Sokushin Kofu-kin (Subsidies for Promotion for Rice Farming Structural Reform) in the national budget 
gives the fiscal expenditure for the new program. According to the national budget, MAFF disbursed 29.0 
billion yen for the new blue box program in 2007. In 2007, to offset the time-lag of implementation, 
additional 12.0 billion yen and 1.3 billion yen were disbursed by Inasaku Shotoku Kiban Kakuho Taisaku 
and Ninai-te Keiei Antei Taisaku, respectively. Thus, we estimated a total of 42.4 (=29.0+12.0+1.3; with 
the rounding error of 0.1) billion yen for the shadow blue box for 2007. 
(4) Green Box  
Japan’s green box programs are classified into 11 categories, (a) to (k), which is different from the format 
used in the national budget; the names of green box programs also differ from those of expenditure items. 
Thus, it can be difficult to correlate these two sources. In addition, a detailed breakdown of fiscal 
expenditures is usually required to estimate green box programs, and this information is generally 
unavailable to the general public.  
We addressed these estimation issues by choosing relevant items from the national budget and 
applying the following equations for our shadow notifications. 
 
Monetary value of program v in year i (v= (a), (b),…, (k); i = 2005, 2006 and 2007) 
= (monetary value of program v in 2004) x (total relevant expenditures for program v in 
year i) / (total relevant expenditures for the green program v in 2004), 
 
The following is the list of green box programs and relevant expenditure items in the national 
budget.  
(a1). Research: general research, research in connection with environmental programmes and research 
programmes relating to particular products (85.1 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Nogyo Seibutsu kei Tokutei Sangyo Gijutu Kenkyu Kiko (Research 
Organization for Designated Industries Related to Agriculture and Biology), No-rin Suisan Seisaku 
Kenkyu-sho (Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), No-rin Suisan 
Gijutsu Kaigi (Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council), Nogyo Seibutsu Shigen Kenkyu-sho 
(National Institute of Agrobiological Sciences), Nogyo Kankyo Gijutsu Kenkyu-sho (National Institute for 
Agro-Environmental Sciences), Noson Kogyo Kenkyu-sho (National Institute for Rural Engineering), 
Shokuhin Sogo Kenkyu-sho (National Food Research Institute), and Kokusai No-rin Suisangyo Kenkyu 
Senta (Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences). These eight expenditures for 2004 
totaled 100.9 billion yen, which is 1.18 times that in the official notifications. We thus estimated the shadow 
(a1) by dividing the total of these eight expenditures by 1.18 for each of the corresponding years. 
(a2). Plant protection: general and product-specific pest and disease control measures (11.2 billion yen in 
the official notifications for 2004).   28  
(a3). Animal health control: general and product-specific animal health control for livestock and 
inspection of animal medicines (6.8 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004)  
Relevant expenditure items: Shubyo Kanri Senta (National Center for Seeds and Seedlings), 
Kachiku Densenbyo Yobo-hi (Expenditures for Livestock Epidemic Prevention), and No-rin Suisan-sho 
Kensa Shido Sho (Inspection and Instruction Center of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). 
The total of these three expenditures for 2004 is 19.4 billion yen, which is roughly approximate to (a2) and 
(a3) expenditures (11.2 billion yen + 6.8 billion yen = 18.0 billion yen). Judging from the item names, (a2) 
appears equivalent to the whole of Shubyo Kanri Senta (3.4 billion yen) and part of No-rin Suisan-sho 
Kensa Shido Sho. Likewise, (a3) seems to consist of the whole of Kachiku Densenbyo Yobo-hi (1.8 billion 
yen) and the remainder of No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa Shido Sho. Thus, we divided No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa 
Shido Sho (14.3 billion yen) into two parts, and calculated the share of (a2) as (11.2 x 19.4/18.0 - 3.4) /14.3 
(= 0.61) and the share of a3 as (6.8 x 19.4/18.0 - 1.8)/14.3 (= 0.39). We then estimated the shadow (a2) and 
(a3) using the following equations: 
 
monetary value of (a2) for year i (i=2005, 2006 and 2007) 
= 11.2 x (fiscal expenditure for Shubyo Kanri Senta for year i + 0.61 x fiscal expenditure for 
No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa Shido Sho for year i) / (fiscal expenditure for Shubyo Kanri Senta for 
2004 + 0.61 x fiscal expenditure for No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa Shido Sho for 2004), and  
 
monetary value of (a3) for year i (i=2005, 2006 and 2007) 
= 6.8 x (fiscal expenditure for Kachiku Densenbyo Yobo-hi for year i + 0.39 x fiscal 
expenditure for No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa Shido Sho for year i) / (fiscal expenditure for 
Kachiku Densenbyo Yobo-hi for 2004 +0.39 x fiscal expenditure for No-rin Suisan-sho Kensa 
Shido Sho for 2004) 
 
(a4). Extension services: education, extension and advisory services and programs for the practical 
application of new technologies (27.9 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Nogyo Keiei Taisaku Chosa tou Itaku-hi (Commission Expenses for 
Survey on Farm Management Policy), Nogyo Keiei Taisaku Minkan Dantai Jigyo Suishin-hi Hojokin 
(Subsidies for Promotion Expenses for Private Organizations’ Activities for Farm Management 
Improvement), Kyodo Nogyo Fukyu Jigyo Kofu-kin (Subsidies for Extension for Group Farming) and 
Nogyo Daigakko (Farmer’s Academy). The total of these four expenditures for 2004 is 28.9 billion yen, 
which is 1.04 times (a4) expenditure in the official notification. We thus estimated the shadow (a4) by 
dividing the total of these four expenditures by 1.04 for each of the corresponding years. 
(a5). Facilitation of management of agricultural organizations: facilitation of training and advisory 
services through agricultural organizations (57.7 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Nogyo Kindaika Shikin Rishi Hokyu tou Hojokin (Subsidies for Grants 
for Paying a Fixed Rate of Interest for Agricultural Modernization Fund), Nogyo Kindaika Shikin Rishi 
Hokyukin (Interest Subsidies for Agricultural Modernization Fund), Nogyo Kyosai Jigyo Tokubetsu Jimu-hi 
Hojokin (Subsidies for Designated Operation Costs for Agricultural Insurance), Nogyo Kyosai Jigyo Un-ei 
Kiban Kyoka Taisaku-hi Hojokin (Subsidies for Operation Framework Reinforcement Policy), Nogyo 
Kyosai Jigyo Jimu-hi Hutankin (Expenses for Operation Costs for Agricultural Insurance), and Nogyo 
Kyosai Hokenkin Shiharai Shikin Shakunyu Risi Kofukin (Interest Subsidies for Borrowed Money for 
Paying Insurance Benefits). The total of these six expenditures for 2004 is 56.6 billion yen, which is 0.98 
times the monetary value of (a5) in the official notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a5) by dividing 
the total of these six expenditures by 0.98 for each of the corresponding years. 
(a6). Compilation of statistical data and information: compilation and provision of statistical data and 
information for producers and consumers (6.1 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004).   29  
Relevant expenditure items: No-rin Gyo Gyo Sensasu Jisshi Chohi (Administrative Expenses for 
the Census of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) and No-rin Gyo Gyo Sensasu Jisshi Itaku-hi 
(Commission Fees for the Census of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The total of these two 
expenditures for 2004 is 6.1 billion yen, which is equivalent to the monetary value of (a6) in the official 
notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a6) by taking the total of these two expenditures for each of 
the corresponding years.  
(a7). Promotion of soil conservation and low-input farming: extension and advisory services, research 
programs for soil conservation and low-input farming (0.0 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
We assumed 0.0 billion yen for the shadow (a7) for 2005-07. 
(a8). Extension and infrastructural services for technological improvement of agricultural 
production: extension and advisory services, research programs, and infrastructural services for 
technological improvement of agricultural production (16.3 billion yen in the official notifications for 
2004). 
See (a12). 
(a9). General services for livestock industry including extension and infrastructure: infrastructural 
services, extension and advisory services on technologies, and information services for promotion of 
livestock products (93.9 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Gyu Niku tou Kanzei Zaigen Chikusan Shinko-hi (Expenses for 
Promotion for Livestock Industry Financed from Tariff on Beef), Nochikusangyo Shinko Taisaku Kofukin 
(Subsidies for Agriculture and Livestock Promotion Policy) in Nogyo Seisan Shinko-hi (Expenses for 
Agricultural Production Promotion) and Nochikusangyo Shinko Kiko Unei-hi (Administrative Expenses for 
the Agriculture and Livestock Promotion Organization) and Kachiku Kairyo Senta (Center for 
Improvement of Livestock). The total of these five expenditures for 2004 is 162.2 billion yen, which is 1.72 
times the monetary value of (a9) in the official notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a9) by dividing 
the total of these five expenditures by 1.72 for each of the corresponding years.  
(a10). Programs for improvement of food marketing, processing and consumption: providing 
marketing information to consumers, research related to food or agricultural products processing, 
marketing promotion, and inspection (10.2 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: No-rin Suisan Shohi Gijutsu Senta (Food and Agricultural Materials 
Inspection Center), Shokuhin Sogo Kenkyu-sho no Shishutsu (Expenses at the National Food Research 
Institute) and Sogo Shokuryo Taisaku-hi (Expenses for Composite Food Policy). The total of these three 
expenditures for 2004 is 8.2 billion yen, which is 0.80 times the monetary value of (a10) in the official 
notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a10) by dividing the total of these three expenditures by 0.80 
for each of the corresponding years. 
(a11). Inspection and information services for agricultural production materials: inspection, research, 
extension and advisory services for agricultural machinery, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, seeds and 
seedlings (3.4 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Hishiryo Kensa Sho (Fertilizer and Feed Inspection Center) and 
Noyaku Kensa Sho (Agricultural Chemicals Inspection Center). The total of these two expenditures for 
2004 is 5.6 billion yen, which is 1.65 times the monetary value of the official notifications. We thus 
estimated the shadow (a11) by dividing the total of these two expenditures by 1.65 for each of the 
corresponding years. 
(a12). Infrastructural services for agricultural sector and rural area: construction of 
irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads, land consolidation (909.9 billion yen in the official 
notifications for 2004).  
In the national budget, (a8) and (a12) cannot be distinguished. All expenditure items under budget 
code #46 seem to be relevant to (a8) and (a12). Budget code #46 consists of Noson Shinko-hi (Rural 
Promotion Expenses), Fusuigai tou Taisaku-hi (Natural Disaster Policy), Nogyo Seisan Kiban Seibi Jigyo   30  
tou Shido Kantoku-hi (Instruction and Management for the Project for Improvement of Production Base), 
Kaigan Jigyo-hi (Expenses for Coastal Projects), Nogyo Seisan Kiban Seibi Jigyo-hi (Expenses for the 
Activities for Improvement of Production Base), Gyuniku tou Kanze Zaigen Nogyo Seisan Kiban Seibi 
Jigyo-hi (Expenses for the Activities for Improvement of Production Base financed by Beef Tariff) Noson 
Seibi Jigyo-hi (Expenses for Rural Areas Improvement), Nochi tou Hozen Kanri Jigyo-hi (Expenses for 
Farmland Maintenance), Norin Gyogyo you Kihatsu-yu Zei Zaigen migawari Noson Seibi Jigyo-hi 
(Expenses for Rural Road Construction financed by Gasoline Tax), Chiho Noseikyoku Kaigan Jigyo Koji 
Sho-hi (Miscellaneous Expenses for Local Agricultural Office’s Coastal Project), and Chiho Noseikyoku 
Jisuberi Taisaku Jigyo Koji Sho-hi (Miscellaneous Expenses for Local Agricultural Office’s Landslide 
Prevention Project). We assumed that shadow (a8) and (a12) increased at the same rate as that for the total 
of all expenditures under budget code #46. Then, using the 2004 (a8) and (a12) as benchmarks, we obtained 
the shadow (a8) and (a12) for 2005-07.   
(a13). Disaster rehabilitation services: reconstruction of irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads 
damaged by natural disasters (112.5 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004).  
Relevant expenditure items: Nogyo Shisetsu Saigai Fukkyu Jigyo-hi (Expenses for Postdisaster 
Reconstruction of Agricultural Facilities) and Nogyo Shisetsu Saigai Kan-ren Jigyo-hi (Expenses for 
Activities Related to Agricultural Facilities Damaged by Disaster). The total of these two expenditures for 
2004 is 112.5 billion yen, which is equivalent to the monetary value of (a13) in the official notifications. We 
thus estimated the shadow (a13) by taking the total of these two expenditures for each of the corresponding 
years.  
(a14). Infrastructural services for market facilities: provision or construction of market facilities (6.0 
billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Sogo Shokuryo Taisaku Chiho Kokyo Dantai Jigyo Suishin-hi Hojokin 
(Subsidies for Local Government’s Promotion for Composite Food Policy) Sogo Shokuryo Taisaku Minkan 
Dantai Jigyo Suishin-hi Hojokin (Subsidies for Private Organization’s Promotion for Composite Food 
Policy), and Oroshi Uri Shijo Shisetsu Seibi-hi (Wholesale Market Maintenance and Improvement). The 
total of these three expenditures for 2004 is 3.7 billion yen, which is 0.62 times the monetary value of (a14) 
in the official notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a14) by dividing the total of these three 
expenditures by 0.62 for each of the corresponding years. 
(a15). Advisory services for structural improvement: advisory services for effective farm land 
utilization (57.9 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Nogyo Keiei Taisaku-hi (Expenses for Farm Management Policy) in documents of the national 
budget is relevant to both (a4) and (a15). By subtracting (a4) from the Nogyo Keiei Taisaku-hi, we obtained 
38.3 billion yen, which is 0.66 times the monetary value of (a15) in the official notifications. We thus 
estimated the shadow (a15) by subtracting the monetary value of (a4) from Nogyo Keiei Taisaku-hi and 
dividing it by0.66 for each of the corresponding years. 
(a16). Personnel expenses for the government officials: personnel expenses for the Government officials 
(254.0 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Norin Suisan Honsho (Head Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries), Norin Suisan Honsho Shisetsu-hi (Expenses for Equipment of the Head Office of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), Chiho Noseikyoku (Local Office of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), Norin Suisan Honsho Shisetsu-hi (Expenses for Equipment of the 
Local Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), Hokkaido Nosei Jimusho (Hokkaido 
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), and Hokkaido Tokei Joho Jimusho 
(Hokkaido Statistical Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The total of these five 
expenditures for 2004 is 210.0 billion yen, which is 0.83 times the monetary value of (a16) in the official 
notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (a16) by dividing the total of these five expenditures by 0.83 
for each of the corresponding years.   31  
(b) Public stockholding: public stockholding of rice, wheat, barley, soya beans and feed grains ( 28.2 
billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Shokuryo Kanri Tokubetsu Kaikei (Food Control Special Account) seems relevant to this 
expenditure. However, Shokuryo Kanri Tokubetsu Kaikei also includes various expenditures in addition to 
those for public stockholding for food security. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to obtain decomposition of 
Shokuryo Kanri Tokubetsu Kaikei. The ratio between the monetary value of (b) (28.2 billion yen) and the 
total fiscal expenditure for Shokuryo Kanri Tokubetsu Kaikei for 2004 (228.9 billion yen) is 0.123. We thus 
estimated the shadow (b) by multiplying the expenditure for Shokuryo Kanri Tokubetsu Kaikei by 0.123 for 
each of the corresponding years.  
(c) School lunch programs: supply of rice, milk, and fruit juice for school children at subsidized prices 
(2.5 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
ALIC’s Gakko Kyushoku Yo Kyushoku Jigyo (Milk Supply Activities for School Lunch Program) 
seems relevant to (c). ALIC disbursed 2.2 million yen for Gakko Kyushoku Yo Kyushoku Jigyo in 2004. We 
estimated of the shadow (c) by dividing ALIC’s Gakko Kyushoku Yo Kyushoku Jigyo by 1.14 (1.14 = 
2.5/2.2) for each of the corresponding years. 
(d) Decoupled income support (0.0 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
We assume that this category includes the new green box programs implemented in 2007 (see the 
description for the 2007 reform in Section 5 in the main text). We estimated this expenditure from various 
documents published from MAFF. 
(f1). Agricultural insurance scheme: government subsidies on premiums of agricultural insurance (47.8 
billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Nogyo Kyosai Saihoken Tokubetsu Kanjo he Kuri-ire (Transferred Money to the Agricultural 
Re-insurance Special Account) of Nogyo Hoken-hi (Expenses for Agricultural Insurance) seems relevant to 
(f1). By subtracting de minimus from the monetary value of Nogyo Kyosai Saihoken Tokubetsu Kanjo he 
Kuri-ire of Nogyo Hoken-hi for 2004, we obtained 49.8 billion yen, which is 1.04 times (f1) in the official 
notifications. We estimated the shadow (f1) from the following equations, 
 
monetary value of (f1) for year i (i=2005, 2006 and 2007) 
=(1/1.04) * (monetary value of Nogyo Kyosai Saihoken 
Tokubetsu Kanjo he Kuri-ire of Nogyo Hoken-hi for year i - de 
minimis for year i) 
 
(f2). Natural disaster relief loans: loans for relief of damaged farmers by natural disasters (0.2 billion yen 
in the official notifications for 2004). 
This expenditure item is difficult to replicate. Since the monetary value of (f2) in the official 
notifications is very small throughout 1995-2004, we assumed 0.0 billion yen for the shadow (f2) for 
2005-08. 
(g1). Farmers' pension programs: payments of pension to retired farmers on condition of transfer of the 
management (0.2 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
Relevant expenditure items: Nogyosha Nenkin tou Jisshi-hi (Operation Expenses for Farmer 
Annuity) and Nogyosha Nenkin Kikin (Foundation for Farmer Annuity). The total of these two expenditures 
for 2004 is 0.2 billion yen, which is exactly the same monetary value of (g1) in the official notifications. We 
thus estimated the shadow (g1) by taking the total of these two expenditures for each of the corresponding 
years. 
(g2). Land retirement programs for citrus production: payments for land retirement from citrus 
production to adjust to changes in the supply and demand situation caused by trade liberalization (0.0 
billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
We assumed 0 billion yen for the shadow (g2).   32  
(h) Programs for reduction of number of livestock: payments for slaughtering of sows and cows to avoid 
overproduction of pork and milk (0.0 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004). 
We assumed 0.0 billion yen for the shadow (h) for 2005-07. 
(i). Agricultural loans: interest concessions for government agricultural loans (22.8 billion yen in the 
official notifications for 2004). 
No-rin Gyo Gyo Kin-yu Koko Hokyukin (Subsidy for the Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 
Finance Corporation) in the national budget seems relevant to (i). The fiscal expenditure for No-rin Gyo 
Gyo Kin-yu Koko Hokyukin for 2004 is 55.0 billion yen, which is 2.41 times the monetary value of (i) in the 
official notifications. We thus estimated the shadow (i) by dividing the expenditure for No-rin Gyo Gyo 
Kin-yu Koko Hokyukin by 2.41 for each of the corresponding years. 
(j1). Environmental programs (158.8 billion yen in the official notifications for 2004).  
Rice set-aside program is the only one that the Japanese government reports to the WTO as 
‘environmental programs’. As discussed in the Section 4 in the main text, rice set-aside program aims for 
diverting a certain percentage of paddy field from rice planting so as to prevent excess-supply of rice. Thus, 
it is unclear whether the rice set-aside program actual has environment-protective effects. Regardless, the 
WTO accepts the Japanese government’s treatment of ‘environmental programs’. Suiden Nogyo Kozo 
Kaikaku Taisaku-hi (Expenses for the Program of Establishment of High-productivity Paddy-field 
Farming) in the national budget corresponds to the rice set-aside program. The fiscal expenditure for Suiden 
Nogyo Kozo Kaikaku Taisaku-hi for 2004 is 151.9 billion yen, which is 0.96 times the monetary value of 
(j1) in the official notifications. We estimated shadow (j1) for by multiplying the expenditure for Suiden 
Nogyo Kozo Kaikaku Taisaku-hi by 0.96 for the corresponding years. 
(j2). Support program for the reduction of environmental burden due to dairy farming: payments to 
dairy farmers who practice appropriate management to tackle environmental problems (8.3 billion yen in 
the official notifications for 2004). 
Nochikusangyo Shinko Kiko (Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation) seems relevant to 
(j2). The fiscal expenditure for Nochikusangyo Shinko Kiko for 2004 is 162.2 billion yen, which is 19.5 
times larger than the monetary value of (j2) in the official notifications. We estimated the shadow (j2) by 
dividing the expenditure for Nochikusangyo Shinko Kiko by 19.5 for each of the corresponding years. 
(k) Direct payment to farmers in the hilly and mountainous areas: payments for farmers who continue 
farming activities for at least five years under the community agreements (16.8 billion yen in the official 
notifications for 2004). 
By subtracting the fiscal expenditure for Chusankan Chi-iki tou Chokusetsu Shiharai Suishin 
Kofukin (Subsidy for Promotion for Direct Payment to Hilly and Mountainous Areas) from that for Noson 
Shinko-hi for 2004, we obtained exactly the same monetary value of (k) in the official notifications. Thus, 
we did the same thing for our shadow (k) for 2005-07. 
5. Comparison of Our Shadow Notifications for 2005-07 and Official Notifications for 2007 
Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 compare the shadow notifications and official notifications for 2005. There is no 
significant difference between the two notifications. This demonstrates reliability of our shadow 
notifications.   33  
Table A.2. Comparison between Japan’s official and our shadow notifications for 2005 
   Official 
notifications 
Shadow 
notifications    
Green Box  Total  1916.3   1908.1 
 (a)  General  service  1465.4    1457.7 
  (b) Public stockholding for food security purposes  24.5   25.6 
  (c) Domestic food aid  3.2   1.8 
  (d) Decoupled income support  -  - 
  (f) Payments for relief from natural disasters  49.0   49.8 
 
(g) Structural adjustment assistance provided through 
producer retirement programmes  155.8   155.7 
 
(i) Structural adjustment assistance provided through 
investment aids  19.9   19.2 
  (j) Environmental programmes  176.7   176.5 
   (k) Regional assistance programmes  21.8   21.8 
Blue Box     65.3   65.3 
Amber Box  Price support  394.7   394.2 
 Domestic  payment  198.6    192.2 
  (share of price support in total AMS)  66.5%  67.2% 
   (de  minimis)  41.3    41.6 
Current total AMS  593.3   586.4 
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Table A.3. Detailed comparison between Japan's official and our shadow notifications for the AMS 
in 2005 
   Official 
notifications 
Shadow 
notifications    
Wheat Price  support  0.0  0.0 
 Direct  payment  94.6  93.6 
   Total  94.6  93.6 
Barley Price  support  0.0  0.0 
 Direct  payment  10.0  11.0 
   Total  10.0  11.0 
Soya beans  Price support  -  - 
 Direct  payment  26.4  26.6 
   Total  26.4  26.6 
Sugar Price  support  54.8  54.4 
 Direct  payment  2.5  2.5 
   Total  57.3  56.9 
Starch Price  support  15.1  15.1 
 Direct  payment  -  - 
   Total  15.1  15.1 
Milk Price  support -  - 
 Direct  payment  26.9  26.2 
   Total  26.9  26.2 
Beef and veal  Price support  72.9  72.9 
 Direct  payment  37.1  31.3 
   Total  110.0  104.2 
Meat of swine  Price support  251.9  251.8 
 Direct  payment  -  - 
   Total  251.9  251.8 
Silk-worm cocoons  Price support  0.0  0.0 
 Direct  payment  1.0  1.0 
 Total 1.0  1.0 
Tatal AMS     593.3  586.4 
De minimis      
Rice   7.5  7.5 
Eggs   1.3  1.4 
Vegetables   13.2  14.5 
Fruits   1.2  1.2 
Agricultural insurance 
scheme 
   18.1  17.0 
Total   41.3  41.6 
      
Total AMS + de minimis     634.6  628.0 
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Table A.4. Detailed comparison between Japan's official and our shadow notifications for the green 
box in 2005 
Measure Type 
Name and description of measure with 
reference to criteria in Annex 2 
   Official 
notifications 
Shadow 
notifications    
(a)  General services  Research:  a1 86.8  76.7 
   Plant protection:  a2 10.9  11.4 
   Animal health control:  a3 7.1  7.0 
   Extension services:  a4 24.2  26.0 
   Facilitation of management of agricultural 
organizations:  a5 57.8  54.4 
   Compilation of statistical data and 
information:  a6 6.5  4.8 
   Extension and infrastructural services for 
technological improvement of agricultural 
production: 
a8 50.2  15.5 
   General services for livestock industry 
including extension and infrastructure:  a9 58.5  79.5 
   Programmes for improvement of food 
marketing, processing and consumption:  a10 10.2  10.0 
   Inspection and information services for 
agricultural production materials:  a11 3.4  1.6 
   Infrastructural services for agricultural sector 
and rural area:  a12 840.0  865.3 
   Disaster rehabilitation services:  a13 41.6  41.6 
   Infrastructural services for market facilities:  a14 -  6.9 
   Advisory services for structural 
improvement:  a15 34.7  16.7 
   Personnel expenses for the Government 
officials:  a16 233.5  240.3 
(b)  Public stockholding for food 
security purposes 
Public stockholding: 
b 24.5  25.6 
(c)  Domestic food aid  School lunch programmes:  c 3.2  1.8 
(d) Decoupled income support  Cross-commodity income stabilization based 
on historical acres:  d -  - 
(f)  Payments for relief from natural 
disasters 
Agricultural insurance scheme:  f1 48.9  49.8 
   Natural disaster relief loans:  f2 0.1  0.0 
(g)  Structural adjustment assistance 
provided through producer retirement 
programmes 
Farmers' pension programmes: 
g1 155.8  155.7 
(i)  Structural adjustment assistance 
provided through investment aids 
Agricultural loans: 
i 19.9  19.2 
(j)  Environmental programmes  Payments for conversion from rice 
production:  j1 168.4  169.0 
   Support programme for reduction of 
environmental burden due to dairy farming:   j2 8.3  7.5 
(k)  Regional assistance programmes  Direct payment to farmers in the hilly and 
mountainous areas:    k 21.8  21.8 
Total        1916.3  1908.1   36  
Table A.4. Continued 
Measure Type  Name and description of measure 
with reference to criteria in 
Annex 2 
code 
              
(a)  General services  Research: 
a1 
general research, research in connection with environmental 
programmes, and research programmes relating to particular 
products.  
   Plant protection:  a2  general and product-specific pest and disease control 
measures.  
   Animal health control: 
a3 
general and product-specific animal health control for 
livestock and animal medicine inspection. 
   Extension services: 
a4 
education, extension and advisory services, and programmes 
for practical application of new technologies. 
   Facilitation of management of 
agricultural organizations:  a5  facilitation of training and advisory services through 
agricultural organizations. 
   Compilation of statistical data and 
information:  a6 
compilation and provision of statistical data and information 
for producers and consumers.  
   Extension and infrastructural 
services for technological 
improvement of agricultural 
production: 
a8 
extension and advisory services, research programmes, and 
infrastructural services for technological improvement of 
agricultural production.  
   General services for livestock 
industry including extension and 
infrastructure: 
a9 
infrastructural services, extension and advisory services on 
technologies, and information services for promotion of 
livestock products.  
   Programmes for improvement of 
food marketing, processing and 
consumption: 
a10 
providing marketing information to consumers, research 
related to food or agricultural products processing, marketing 
promotion, and inspection.  
   Inspection and information services 
for agricultural production 
materials: 
a11 
inspection, research, extension and advisory services for 
agricultural machinery, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, 
seeds and seedlings.  
   Infrastructural services for 
agricultural sector and rural area:  a12  construction of irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads, 
land consolidation.  
   Disaster rehabilitation services: 
a13 
reconstruction of irrigation/drainage facilities and rural roads 
damaged by natural disasters. 
   Infrastructural services for market 
facilities:  a14  provision or construction of market facilities.  
   Advisory services for structural 
improvement:  a15  advisory services for effective farm land utilization. 
   Personnel expenses for the 
Government officials:  a16  personnel expenses for the Government officials. 
(b)  Public stockholding 




public stockholding of rice, wheat, barley, soya beans and 
feedgrains. 
(c)  Domestic food aid  School lunch programmes:  c  supply of rice, milk, and fruit juice for school children at 
subsidized prices. 
(d) Decoupled income 
support 
Cross-commodity income 
stabilization based on historical 
acres: 
d 
decoupled income support based on historical acres for 
farmers harvesting soybeans, wheat, barley, sugar cane and 
potato for starch 
(f)  Payments for relief 
from natural disasters 
Agricultural insurance scheme:  f1  government subsidies on premiums of agricultural insurance.  
   Natural disaster relief loans:  f2  loans for relief of damaged farmers by natural disasters.  
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Table 4. Continued 
Measure Type  Name and description of measure 
with reference to criteria in 
Annex 2 
code 
              





Farmers' pension programmes: 
g1 
payments of pension to retired farmers on condition of transfer 
of the management.  






interest concessions for government programmed agricultural 
loans.  
(j)  Environmental 
programmes 
Payments for conversion from rice 
production: j1 
payments for maintaining paddy fields in environmentally 
good condition through growing any plants other than rice or 
other appropriate managements.  
   Support programme for reduction 
of environmental burden due to 
dairy farming:   
j2 
payments to dairy farmers who practice appropriate 
management to tackle environmental problems 
(k)  Regional assistance 
programmes 
Direct payment to farmers in the 
hilly and mountainous areas:    k 
payments for farmers who continue farming activities for at 
least five years under the community agreements. 
 
6. Detailed Projections of Domestic Support for 2008-15 
(1). Amber Box 
Direct Payment 
As described in the fourth section of this appendix, Japan had non-exempt direct payment programs for 
wheat, barley, soya beans, sugar, milk, beef, veal, and silk-worm cocoons in 2007. In 2008, programs for 
wheat, barley, soya beans and starch were revised into a new amber box program of direct payment. MAFF 
budgeted 1.7 billion yen for the new program for 2008. We assumed 1.7 billion yen for the amber box direct 
payment program for these four commodities for our projection for 2009-15. For milk beef, veal, and 
silk-worm cocoons, we took the average for amount of ‘direct payment’ for 2005-07 for each commodity 
and use it as our projected value for 2008 and thereafter.  
Market Price Support 
As described in the third section of this appendix, Japan had market price support programs for soya beans, 
sugar, milk, beef, veal, and silk-worm cocoons in 2007. 
As discussed above, total market price support for each commodity is calculated as the product of 
eligible production and the difference between the administered price and the reference price. We assumed 
that administered and external reference prices for 2008-15 are the same as those for 2007. We estimated 
eligible production by taking log-linear extrapolations from 5-year production data (2003 to 2007).  
(2). De minimis 
In 2008, MAFF launched a new de minimis program and prepared a budget of 55.5 billion yen for the first 
year. By adding 55.5 billion yen to the total amount of de minimis for 2007 (35.4 billion yen), we obtained 
91.0 billion yen (with the rounding error of 0.1). We assumed that Japan’s de minimis would be unchanged 
at 91.0 billion yen for 2008-15. 
(3). Blue Box 
Inasaku Kozo Kaikaku Sokushin Kofukin (Subsidy for Promotion for Rice Farming Structural Reform), 
which started in 2007 and is the only one-expenditure item in the blue box in 2008, is scheduled to   38  
terminate in 2010. MAFF budgeted 32.4 billion yen for the Inasaku Kozo Kaikaku Sokushin Kofukin for 
2008. For Inasaku Kozo Kaikaku Sokushin Kofukin for 2009, we took the average value of Inasaku Kozo 
Kaikaku Sokushin Kofukin for 2007-08 (30.7 billion yen), and assumed that Japan’s blue box would be 
empty for 2010-15. 
(4). Green Box  
We assumed that the monetary values (a1), (a4), (a6), (a8), (a9), (a13) from 2008 to 2015 would remain at 
the 5-year average for 2003-07. For (b), which was implemented in 2006, we used the 2-year average for 
2006-07 instead of the 5-year average. We assumed that the monetary values of (a7), (f2), (g) and (h), which 
were zero in 2007, would remain at zero from 2008 to 2015. We extrapolated monetary values for the other 
programs by taking log-linear regressions for 2003-07.   39  
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